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INTRODUCTION
Valuation for transfer tax purposes can be an exceedingly difficult
endeavor. When a robust market exists for a given asset, the calculus
becomes simpler.1 For closely-held business interests, however, markets
often provide little guidance. Particularly when family-owned, these assets are distinctive by nature. These distinctive characteristics—including contracted restrictions and arrangements among owners—can be a
reasonable basis for discounting assessed value. Restrictions can be imposed for good-faith business purposes. Under the traditional “willing
* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School. For my wife. With profound gratitude to Professor David J. Stoll and the ACTEC Foundation. Any errors are my own.
1 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(b)-(d) (as amended 2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.25122(b)-(d) (as amended 1976) (explaining that in such cases, the chief issue is establishing
the relationship between the timing and weight of market valuations and the time of
death or transfer).
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buyer/willing seller” test of value,2 restrictions often materially decrease
the present value of business interests. It is also true that, in addition to
such warranted discounts, owners have a natural incentive to self-impose artificial, value-depressing business entity restrictions in order to
minimize their transfer tax liability.3 As such, ideal valuation rules strike
a balance between respecting legitimate discounts and disregarding the
chaff of artificial, tax-driven business arrangements. Rules that disallow
legitimate discounts effectively create an additional tax on closely-held
(as opposed to marketable) interests, while overly permissive rules create the inverse tax. Both outcomes are inefficient.
Sections4 27035 and 2704(b)6 contend with this problem, specifically
as applied to discount-generating restrictions on family-owned prop2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended 1965) (“[F]air market value is the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”).
3 But see Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, Estate Tax Relief and the Erosion of
Capital Gains Tax Revenues, 133 TAX NOTES 733, 733-35 (2011) (noting that a higher
exemption coupled with basis step-up incentivizes high valuations for taxpayers below
the exemption amount). This high-valuation incentive is pertinent for lower-wealth taxpayers, but such taxpayers are presumably less likely to own substantial interests subject
to Chapter 14. Higher-wealth taxpayers often remain incentivized to depress value as
long as the applicable transfer tax exceeds the applicable capital gains tax, assuming the
interest will be sold, taking into account both rates and basis. See id.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
5 Section 2703 reads as follows:
§ 2703. Certain rights and restrictions disregarded

(a) General rule. For purposes of this subtitle, the value of any property shall be
determined without regard to: (1) any option, agreement, or other right to acquire or use the property at a price less than the fair market value of the property (without regard to such option, agreement, or right), or (2) any restriction
on the right to sell or use such property.
(b) Exceptions. Subsection (a) shall not apply to any option, agreement, right,
or restriction which meets each of the following requirements: (1) It is a bona
fide business arrangement, (2) It is not a device to transfer such property to
members of the decedent’s family for less than full and adequate consideration
in money or money’s worth, [and] (3) Its terms are comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms’ length transaction.
6 Section 2704(b) reads as follows:
(b) Certain restrictions on liquidation disregarded.
(1) In general. For purposes of this subtitle, if: (A) there is a transfer of an
interest in a corporation or partnership to (or for the benefit of) a member of
the transferor’s family, and (B) the transferor and members of the transferor’s
family hold, immediately before the transfer, control of the entity, any applicable restriction shall be disregarded in determining the value of the transferred
interest.
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erty.7 Section 2703 gives the IRS, when valuing such property, broad
authority to disregard “any option, agreement, or other right to acquire
or use” the property, as well as “any restriction on the right to sell or use
such property.”8 The IRS must respect those agreements and restrictions only if they qualify for a safe harbor.9 The safe harbor attempts to
delineate (and respect) legitimate agreements and restrictions. Section
2704(b) follows, in form, a similar scheme.10
When Congress enacted §§ 2703 and 2704(b) as part of Chapter
14’s special transfer tax valuation rules,11 the issue of balance was front
and center. Congress had failed to achieve balance in § 2036(c), the
overly-aggressive predecessor to Chapter 14.12 As the Senate voted to
replace § 2036(c) with Chapter 14, the Senate Finance Committee noted
that the “complexity, breadth, and vagueness” of § 2036(c) posed “an
unreasonable impediment” to family businesses.13 However, Congress
(2) Applicable restriction. For purposes of this subsection, the term “applicable
restriction” means any restriction: (A) which effectively limits the ability of the
corporation or partnership to liquidate, and (B) with respect to which either of
the following applies: (i) The restriction lapses, in whole or in part, after the
transfer referred to in paragraph (1), [or] (ii) The transferor or any member of
the transferor’s family, either alone or collectively, has the right after such transfer to remove, in whole or in part, the restriction.
(3) Exceptions. The term “applicable restriction” shall not include: (A) any
commercially reasonable restriction which arises as part of any financing by the
corporation or partnership with a person who is not related to the transferor or
transferee, or a member of the family of either, or (B) any restriction imposed,
or required to be imposed, by any Federal or State law.
(4) Other restrictions. The Secretary may by regulations provide that other restrictions shall be disregarded in determining the value of the transfer of any
interest in a corporation or partnership to a member of the transferor’s family if
such restriction has the effect of reducing the value of the transferred interest
for purposes of this subtitle but does not ultimately reduce the value of such
interest to the transferee.
7 See id. § 2704(b)(1)(B) (stating § 2704 is only applicable when transferor and/or
family “hold . . . control of the entity”); Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3) (stating § 2703 is
inapplicable when non-family members own “more than 50 percent . . . of the property”).
8 I.R.C. § 2703(a)(1)-(2).
9 See I.R.C. § 2703(b).
10 See infra Part III. As will be discussed, while similar in form, these sections have
diverged in substantive efficacy.
11 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11602, 104
Stat. 1388, 1498-99 (1990) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2703, 2704(b)).
12 See Richard L. Dees, Section 2036(c): The Monster That Ate Estate Planning and
Installment Sales, Buy-Sells, Options, Employment Contracts and Leases, 68 TAXES 876
(1988).
13 136 CONG. REC. 30, 538 (1990). Practitioners were franker in their assessments. A
representative of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel deemed § 2036(c) a
“disaster.” ‘Discussion Draft’ Relating to Estate Valuation Freezes: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 92 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of E.
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did not want to repeal § 2036(c) without a replacement. The Committee
remained “concerned about potential estate and gift tax valuation
abuses”14— hence the “targeted rules” of Chapter 14.15 In particular,
Congress noted a concern for even-handed application with § 2703.16
Nearly a quarter of a century after Chapter 14’s enactment, it is
worth considering whether §§ 2703 and 2704(b) have, in practice,
achieved their congressionally-intended balance. Now is also an ideal
time to take stock of these Code sections given hints of potential new
IRS rulemaking pursuant to § 2704.17 These two sections offer an enlightening study in contrasts. In Part I, this Article argues that, at least
as interpreted through case law, § 2703 has come to strike that congressionally-mandated balance successfully. However, Part II discusses two
chief problems that remain in the provision’s application. First, as illustrated through the dissenting opinion in Holman v. Commissioner,18
drafting ambiguities have engendered unnecessary (though non-fatal)
complexities regarding the provision’s interrelation with earlier case law
and regulations. Second, issues have arisen with valuation. Once restrictions are deemed ineligible for the § 2703(b) safe harbor, courts have
taken a muddled approach to the quantitative valuation impact.19 Also
on that valuation front, courts have accorded improper § 2703 treatment
to certain insurance proceeds.20 Part III then turns to § 2704(b). Reviewing the history and implementation of the statute, this Article argues that § 2704(b) has been an unmitigated failure. The poor drafting
of § 2704(b) has rendered it too easy to circumvent. In Part IV, this
Article considers the interrelation between §§ 2703 and 2704(b), as well
as potential fixes to § 2704(b). While reparative legislation is necessary
to fix § 2704(b), a partial remedy is possible through a simple amendment to the provision’s companion regulations. Also, if and when a legJames Gamble, Chairman, Estate and Gift Tax Committee of the American College Of
Trust and Estate Counsel). Another practitioner called it “Frankenstein’s monster.”
Dees, supra note 12, at 876.
14 136 CONG. REC. 30, 538.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 539 (remarking on the need to balance legitimate reasons for buy-sell
agreements and other similar restrictions with the potential for abuse).
17 See Steve R. Akers, Speculation About Upcoming Section 2704 Proposed Regulation, BESSEMER TR. (June 2015), http://www.bessemertrust.com/portal/binary/com.epicen
tric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Advisor/Presentation/Print%20
PDFs/Section%202704%20Regulation%20Speculation_June%202015.pdf. At writing,
these potential revisions are too speculative for in-depth consideration, but this Article
will certainly help inform any discussion of these revisions once they are made public.
18 Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 776-84 (8th Cir. 2010) (Beam, J., dissenting).
19 E.g., Id. at 773-76.
20 E.g., Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, 428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005).
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islative fix becomes feasible, this comparison with § 2703 points toward
an approach that is more efficient than current proposals.
I. SECTION 2703: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
POST-ENACTMENT INTERPRETATION

AND

A. Legislative History
In assessing § 2703, legislative history provides an important lens
through which to consider certain interpretive issues with the statute.
As can be charted through successive drafts of § 2703, the statute
evolved from one primarily built on new tax law concepts to one that
borrowed heavily from existing standards and regulations. In the initial
“discussion draft” of Chapter 14, the § 2703-equivalent was quite different from its enacted form.21 The section had the same basic structure as
the enacted § 2703. The first part required a general disregard of discount-generating restrictions on closely-held business interests, and the
second part provided a safe harbor against that default disregard.22
However, while the form is similar, the substance diverges. In its first
section, the discussion draft covered a narrower set of restrictions—only
buy-sell options, rights of first refusal and leases.23 That contrasts with
the far more capacious § 2703(a), which covers “any option, agreement,
or other right to acquire or use” the property in question,24 along with
“any restriction on the right to sell or use” the property.25
The discussion draft’s safe harbor was also dramatically different
from the one codified in § 2703(b). As a threshold issue, only buy-sell
agreements were eligible for the safe harbor, so ROFRs and restrictive
leases could not qualify.26 Also, the safe harbor itself involved burdensome, bright-line requirements. To qualify, for instance, the buy-sell
agreement had to be exercised (rather than just allowing property subject to the agreement to pass via gift or bequest),27 and the buy-sell
price had to be “reviewed” within the past three years.28 These aspects
of the safe harbor did little to delineate legitimate buy-sell restrictions
from artificial ones. The exercise requirement, for example, does nothing to get at the fairness of the price. If the buy-sell price is artificially
21 See Hearing, supra note 13, at 20-21. In this draft, the § 2703-equivalent was
numbered as § 2702.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 I.R.C. § 2703(a)(1).
25 Id. § 2703(a)(2). This broader formulation of § 2703(a), as contrasted with the
discussion draft, is of particular interpretive importance. See infra Part II.B.1.
26 Hearing, supra note 13, at 20-21.
27 Id.
28 Id.

202

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:197

low, then family can fulfill that requirement by exercising at that bargain
price. Overall, the safe harbor largely omitted existing valuation principles to instead create “a new set of rules” to govern the transfer tax
valuation effects of the covered restrictions.29 The next legislative draft
of § 2703, again originating in the House, generally built on the discussion draft.30 However, this House approach was jettisoned. The § 2703equivalent in a subsequent Senate bill largely contained the language
used in the enacted version of the statute,31 and the House acquiesced
to the Senate approach.32
In contrast to those early House drafts, the Senate formulation pulled standards from existing case law and regulations. The first two requirements of the Senate’s three-pronged safe harbor—that the
restriction be a “bona fide business arrangement” and also “not a device
to transfer such property” at below FMV33—both came from existing
Treasury Regulations and established case law.34 The third prong—that
the restriction “be comparable to similar arrangements entered into by
persons in an arms’ [sic] length transaction”35—was not an independent
test in existing regulations.36 However, even this allegedly novel “arm’slength” requirement was found in prior case law.37
There are a few interpretive lessons in this legislative progression
from “a new set of rules” to established standards.38 First, because of
this shift, the statute allows for precedential continuity. When explicating § 2703, courts can—and do—reason from pre-section 2703 cases and
29

Hearing, supra note 13, at 98.
See generally H.R. 5425, 101st Cong. § 2703 (1990).
31 S. 3113, 101st Cong. § 3(e) (1990).
32 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11602, 104
Stat. 1388, 1498 (1990) (codified at I.R.C. § 2703).
33 I.R.C. §§ 2703(b)(1)-(2); S. 3113 § 3(e).
34 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (as amended 1992); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3(c) (as
amended 1992); e.g., St. Louis Cnty. Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir.
1982); Estate of Bischoff v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 32, 39 (1977); see also Rev. Rul. 59–60,
1959–1 C.B. 237. Pre-section 2703, there was some question as to whether these two
requirements were separate tests or if fulfillment of one necessarily entailed fulfillment of
the other. See Estate of Gloeckner v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1998); Roth v.
United States, 511 F. Supp. 653, 654-55 (E.D. Mo. 1981), rev’d sub nom. St. Louis Cnty.
Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982). However, § 2703 codified these
requirements as independent.
35 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(3); S. 3113 § 3(e).
36 136 CONG. REC. 30,541 (1990) (“[T]he bill adds a third requirement, not found in
present law.”).
37 Estate of True v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-176, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 48 (2001)
(“[T]he arm’s-length requirement has always been a factor used . . . to decide whether a
buy-sell agreement’s price was determinative of value.”), aff’d, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir.
2004).
38 Hearing, supra note 13, at 98.
30
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regulations.39 Absent some reason to the contrary, these established
portions of § 2703 should be interpreted in accordance with their preenactment meaning.40 Congress considered (and rejected) a “new rules”
approach, one that would have required de novo interpretation.
However, precedential continuity is only part of the story. A complementary consideration is that proper interpretation should pay close
attention to the ways in which the statute departed from established law.
For instance, pre-section 2703 case law and regulations are chiefly
targeted at buy-sell agreements.41 Congress enacted a statute with far
greater breadth. As the legislative history shows, Congress considered a
statute that retained a targeted approach to covered restrictions,42 but
that approach lost out.
Lastly, while § 2703 codified existing standards, the statute was only
a partial codification, one “meant to supplement, not replace, prior case
law.”43 As the Senate Finance Committee stipulated, § 2703 was not intended to “alter the requirements for giving weight to a buy-sell agreement” or other covered restrictions.44 As such, if the statute does not
overrule a standard in prior case law or regulation, such a standard
should be assumed to remain applicable.
B. Post-Enactment Interpretation
With those interpretive lessons in mind, it is possible to turn to subsequent judicial interpretation of the statute and its companion regulations to determine whether § 2703 has achieved, in practice, its intended
39 E.g., Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017,
1026-27 (2006); see also JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION, § 604(2)(a)
n.241 (2014) (noting § 2703’s heavy borrowing “from prior law”).
40 Practitioners have long recognized this continuity. E.g., Jerold I. Horn, Buy-Sell
Agreements Under Chapter 14, Including Amendment/Modification of Grandfathered
Agreements, and Drafting New Agreements, 21 ACTEC NOTES 37, 38 (1995) (“Code section 2703 purports to codify the law.”).
41 The relevant regulations refer to “an option or a contract to purchase securities
owned by a decedent” and not other types of restrictions. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h)
(as amended 1992); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3(c) (as amended 1992); see also Estate of
Gloeckner v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1998); Roth v. United States, 511 F.
Supp. 653, 654-55 (E.D. Mo. 1981), rev’d sub nom. St. Louis Cnty. Bank v. United States,
674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982).
42 See H.R. 5425, 101st Cong. § 2703(a)(1)-(3) (1990).
43 Estate of Amlie, T.C. Memo 2006-27, 91 T.C. M. (CCH) 1017, 1024 (2006).
44 136 CONG. REC. 30,541 (1990). The legislative record tends to refer to buy-sell
agreements synecdochically as shorthand for all of § 2703’s covered restrictions, so this
quote can be read to refer to all such restrictions. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-964, at 1137
(1990) (Conf. Rep.) (title of “Buy-sell agreements and options” used for section discussing all of § 2703’s covered restrictions).
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balance. In this analysis, it is most efficient to work through the statute
piece-by-piece.
On its face, § 2703 sweeps broadly. Its first section—§ 2703(a)—
seemingly covers any property “restriction” or “option.”45 If any “restriction” or “option” fails to qualify for the subsequent safe harbor in
§ 2703(b),46 then transfer tax valuations must be calculated “without regard to” that “restriction or “option.”47 One can see the potentially pervasive reach of that broad language. Absent any other limits, all
property restrictions and options would have to jump through the hoops
required to qualify for the three-pronged § 2703(b) safe harbor. However, in the spirit of Congress’s intention for “targeted rules” in Chapter
14,48 regulations and related case law add effective, bright-line standards
that delimit § 2703(a)’s reach. These bright-line standards efficiently cull
out most legitimate restrictions and options without permitting abuse.
The most impactful bright-line test is found in the companion regulations. Any restriction or option is deemed to fulfill the safe harbor
automatically “if more than 50 percent of the value of the property subject to the right or restriction is owned. . .by individuals who are not
members of the transferor’s family.”49 In other words, if a businesses or
property is not family-controlled, then it is deemed to comply with the
safe harbor. This deemed compliance is only effective, however, if the
third-party owners are subject to the right or restriction “to the same
extent” as the transferor.50
This deemed compliance provision is an elegant solution to potential overbroad application of § 2703. As will become evident in case-law
analysis of § 2703(b), the three prongs of the safe harbor require a laborious, fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether a given option or restriction qualifies.51 It takes considerable effort and creates planning
45 I.R.C. §2703(a). It is true that, per § 2703(a)(2), the provision only covers restrictions on “the right to sell or use” property. Id. However, this phrase does little (if anything) to limit the scope of § 2703. If “use” is defined with sufficient breadth, it is hard to
conceive of a property restriction that would be a restriction on something other than
sale or use. In other words, in this valuation context, virtually any restriction on property
will be a restriction on sale or use, unless “use” is given a narrow interpretation. In case
law, the Tax Court has confidently applied such a broad definition of use. See Estate of
Elkins v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 86 (2013) (applying broad definition of “sale or use” in the
§ 2703 context), aff’d on this issue, rev’d in part on other grounds, 767 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.
2014). Thus, it is extremely unlikely that § 2703 will ever fail to apply because the restriction at issue is not considered to be a restriction on sale or use.
46 I.R.C. § 2703.
47 Id.
48 136 CONG. REC. 30,538.
49 Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3).
50 Id.
51 For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 69-148.
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uncertainty to require actual compliance with the full safe harbor. As
such, § 2703(b) should only come into play in difficult, borderline situations where such effort is warranted. At the same time, the safe harbor,
for all that difficulty, is trying to answer one core question: is the restriction or option something that arm’s-length economic actors would rationally accept as a business matter? This deemed compliance regulation
circumvents § 2703(b) when the nuances of the safe harbor are unnecessary to answer that question. Families and likely beneficiaries may be
able to collusively self-impose value-destructive restrictions or options,
but unrelated third parties are loath to destroy the long-term value of
their property for the short-term transfer tax gain of minority owners.52
Importantly, “family” is broadly defined here to include any “natural
objects of the transferor’s bounty,”53 so the third-party owners must be
strictly disinterested when it comes to gifts or bequests from the transferor. Moreover, even when this deemed compliance is available, the
option or restriction is still subject to other valuation requirements.54
For instance, if a buy-sell option is only binding at death (and parties are
otherwise “free to dispose of [the property]. . .at any price”),55 that option will be disregarded in transfer tax valuation notwithstanding the
deemed compliance.56 As such, third parties must be truly locked in to
restrictions or options for them to retain effect under the deemed compliance regulation. In such circumstances, it is not necessary to postulate
what self-interested third-party negotiators would do—their actions will
speak for themselves.
The other bright-line standards could be described as deemed noncompliance rules. As noted above, § 2703 is only a partial codification of
the relevant standards. To be respected, restrictions and options need to
fulfill other requirements. Just as § 25.2703-1(b)(3) provides an effective
heuristic to deem compliance without intensive § 2703(b) review, these
other requirements can be applied as a threshold matter to disregard
restrictions or options. The first set of requirements grow out of the
“Wilson-Lomb test.”57 Any restriction or option must “be enforceable
52 For value-destroying restrictions or options, third parties will lose value dollarfor-dollar, while the transferor only gains its portion of the destroyed value multiplied by
the transfer tax rate (assuming the exemption has been exhausted). Since the transferor
must be a minority owner for deemed compliance, the third-party losses will always exceed the transferor’s tax savings.
53 Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3).
54 E.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (as amended 1992); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3(c) (as
amended 1992).
55 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h).
56 Id.
57 Estate of True v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-176, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 48 (2001)
(quoting Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166, 167 (2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682,
683 (2d Cir. 1932); Estate of Salt v. Comm’r, 17 T.C. 92, 99-100 (1951)), aff’d, 390 F.3d
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against the parties” and “bind transferors both during life and at
death.”58 In other words, the restrictions or options must be real and
legally enforceable, and the transferor cannot retain the unilateral ability to circumvent or revoke them. The most common taxpayer issue here
arises when the transferor has unilateral authority to remove or void the
option or restriction.59 In practice, these Wilson-Lomb components
have been used to avoid the intensive § 2703(b) analysis.60 The other
avenue for “deemed noncompliance” is when, as a matter of business
entity law, a transferor fails to respect the entity to which a restriction or
option relates.61 In the same vein, courts can also apply the step transaction doctrine to disregard imposed restrictions or options, although
courts have employed that tactic sparingly.62
In sum, case law and regulations smartly limit § 2703. The broad
language of § 2703(a) would otherwise pull far too many taxpayers into
the exhaustive § 2703(b) analysis. The heuristics for deemed compliance
and deemed noncompliance address estate freeze concerns efficiently,
leaving only the hard cases for analysis under the safe harbor. However,
that is not to say all circumscription of § 2703(a)’s broad language is
good. The bright-line heuristics here only work because, unlike the arbitrary bright-line rules in the House predecessor to § 2703,63 they accurately separate legitimate options and restrictions from artificial, taxdriven ones. An early 5th Circuit case illustrated how narrowing of
§ 2703(a) can be improper. In Church v. United States,64 the court con1210 (10th Cir. 2004). These requirements have evolved specifically in the context of buysell agreements, but insofar as they are possible to apply to other § 2703-covered restrictions or options, it seems reasonable to assume they should be applied. It would be a
losing argument, for example, to argue that a discount-generating transfer restriction
must be respected even if the transferor can unilaterally revoke it.
58 Estate of True, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 48. The Wilson-Lomb test also includes the
“ascertainable price” requirement, but per the preceding footnote, that requirement falls
into the category of requirements that do not make sense when applied outside of buysell agreements.
59 E.g., Bommer Revocable Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-380, 74 T.C.M.
(CCH) 346, 353 (1997).
60 E.g., Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-116, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303,
1312 (2004), aff’d on this issue, 428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005); Smith v. United States, No.
02-264 ERIE., 2005 WL 3021918, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 22, 2005).
61 E.g., Estate of Jorgensen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-66, 97 T.C.M. (CCH)
1328, 1336 (2009) (“Ms. Jorgensen and her children often failed to treat the partnerships
as separate entities.”), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 544 (9th Cir. 2011). This case did not concern
§ 2703, but it illustrates the principle. See also Steven M. Fast et al., Context Matters:
Rules for Reducing Taxable Value, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 141, 143, 150 n.15 (2010).
62 Fast et al., supra note 61, at 145-46.
63 E.g., H.R. 5425, 101st Cong. § 2703(b)(1)(C) (1990).
64 Church v. United States, No. SA-97-CA-0774-OG, 2000 WL 206374 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 18, 2000), aff’d, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001).

Spring 2015]

I.R.C. SECTIONS 2703 AND 2704(B)

207

tended that, based on the legislative history, § 2703(a) was only intended to cover buy-sell agreements (and not other restrictions like
transfer limits).65 It is hard to see what aspect of the legislative history
supports that conclusion. To the contrary, earlier versions of § 2703 specifically enumerated the types of covered restrictions,66 but Congress
rejected that approach for the capacious language of the enacted
§ 2703(a). If that congressional choice means anything, it means that the
Church court is wrong. Thankfully, while a later court gestured toward
the Church view,67 it seems to have disappeared in subsequent case
law.68
While precedent and regulations efficiently winnow the cases that
require a § 2703(b) analysis, it must be determined whether, among the
remaining cases, courts have employed the three prongs of § 2703(b) to
discern accurately between legitimate and purely tax-driven restrictions
and options. Two cases—Holman and Estate of Amlie69—illustrate
where recent jurisprudence has drawn that line.
The first prong asks whether a restriction or option is “a bona fide
business arrangement.”70 Precedent offers ample guidance for what
qualifies as such an arrangement. A restriction or option can qualify, for
instance, if the arrangement furthers “maintenance of family ownership
and control” of a business.71 For § 2703, that “family control” rationale
is vitally important, since true § 2703(b) analyses are generally (though
not always) targeted at family-controlled entities.72 This family control
rationale is not just valid as a matter of precedent, but also as a matter
of economic reason. It makes intuitive economic sense that a value-maximizing family business could be motivated to contractually mandate
sustained family control. A business often functions most efficiently

65

Id. at *8.
H.R. 5425, 101st Cong. § 2703(a)(1)-(3). In its read of the regulations, the Church
court also seemingly ignores Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(3). See also Rev. Rul. 2008-35,
2008-29 I.R.B. 116.
67 Smith v. United States, No. C.A. 02-264 ERIE, 2004 WL 1879212, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
June 30, 2004), report and recommendation adopted, No. C.A. 02-264 ERIE, 2004 WL
2051218 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2004).
68 The Holman courts did not even mention the Church view. Holman v. Comm’r,
130 T.C. 170 (2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010).
69 Id.; Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017
(2006).
70 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(1).
71 Estate of Bischoff v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 32, 39 (1977); see also St. Louis Cnty. Bank
v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 1982).
72 Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3).
66
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when its owners share homogeneous goals and interests.73 Family control can provide precisely such homogeneity. That familial cohesion is
perhaps the primary organizational advantage that a family business can
have. Accordingly, rational family shareholders may be willing to decrease the immediate value of their holdings—through restrictions and
buy-sell options—to cement family control. That control can, at least
theoretically, drive the long-term value of the business. Such arrangements can be legitimate as a theoretical business matter, so § 2703(b)(1)
should (and does) respect them.
However, this rationale loses its validity when the restrictions or
options have no relation to the management of an actual business. The
Holman court recognized as much.74 In Holman, the taxpayers moved
their public Dell stock—an immaterial amount relative to Dell’s market
capitalization—into a restrictive partnership and then gifted partnership
interests to their children.75 On their gift tax returns for the relevant
years, the taxpayers claimed steep discounts on the gifts’ values relative
to the market price of the Dell equity.76 In this context, the family control rationale has no relevance.77 The partnership restrictions did nothing to further efficient family management of an enterprise, since there
was no enterprise.78 The restricted entity was “a mere asset
container.”79 The Holman court rightly denied the “family management/
control” rationale as viable in this context for § 2703(b)(1).80
That is not to say that investment entities cannot qualify under
§ 2703(b)(1). On the investment front, the Holman court noted that the
“strongest cases” for the taxpayers were a cluster of three decisions
where a legitimate business purpose was found for “investment entities
73 See HENRY B. HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 39-44 (1996); Henry
B. Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 267, 302 (1988). That homogeneity helps to decrease the costs and difficulty of collective decision-making.
74 Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We. . .have held. . .family
ownership and control of [a] business may be a bona fide business purpose. . .We have
not so held. . .in the absence of a business.”(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
75 Id. at 765.
76 Id. at 766-67. The taxpayers attempted to claim an over 49% discount to the
shares’ market price.
77 Id. at 770 (“In answering the question of whether a restriction constitutes a bona
fide business arrangement, context matters.”).
78 Id. at 771. The only business at issue was Dell, and of course, these restrictions
and options did nothing to affect Dell’s management or operations.
79 Id. at 772 (quoting Estate of Erickson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2007-107, 93
T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1181 (2007)).
80 Louis A. Mezzullo, Holman Sheds Light on the Reach of § 2703, 35 EST., GIFTS &
TR. J. 249, 252 (2010) (“[I]f the word ‘business’ in [§ 2703(b)(1)]. . .has any meaning, the
Tax Court and the 8th Circuit got it right [in Holman].”).
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with restrictions imposed to ensure perpetuation of an investment
model or strategy.”81 These cited cases all dealt with the “bona-fide
sale” exception to § 2036(a).82 Of the three cases, two are immediately
distinguishable from the Holman facts.83 In these cases—Black and
Murphy—the taxpayers’ families owned, through investment entities,
sizable minority and/or majority stakes in companies and other investment assets.84 The consolidated investment entities were a means to exercise meaningful managerial control over the operations of the
underlying assets. As such, the family management and control rationale
was as valid as it would be for a pure operating (as opposed to investing)
business. The difficult case to distinguish is Estate of Schutt.85 In that
case, much as with the Dell stock in Holman, the investment entities
held stakes in two massive public companies, Exxon and DuPont.86 The
stock was valuable as a monetary matter, but given the size of the companies, the holdings were irrelevant from a shareholder influence perspective.87 The Holman court differentiated Schutt on the basis that the
Schutt taxpayer, unlike those in Holman, was effectuating “a specific
buy-and-hold investment strategy.”88 It is generous to describe the
Schutt investment regime as a “strategy.”89 The taxpayer was merely,
through decades, holding two blue-chip stocks.90 If the Holman taxpayers had stipulated that they had a “specific. . .investment strategy”91 of
perpetually retaining Dell equity, their situation would be indistinguishable from Schutt. It is too easy and formalistic to allow cases to turn on
such a nominal “investment strategy.” Reading between the lines, it thus
seems like Schutt is distinguished for other reasons. As one commentator noted, the judgment may be “that the bona fide business arrangement test is more difficult to satisfy than the bona fide sale exception to
§ 2036(a).”92 In other words, to support the family control rationale
81

Holman, 601 F.3d at 771.
To qualify for this § 2036(a) exception, transfers need a “legitimate business purpose[ ].” Id. The Holman court found this § 2036(a) issue analogous to § 2703(b)(1), or at
least analogous enough to consider these § 2036(a) cases.
83 Estate of Murphy v. United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D.
Ark. Oct. 2, 2009); Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340 (2009). The Holman opinion
did not state how distinguishable these two cases are, but that judgment is implicit in the
opinion’s greater focus on Schutt. Holman, 601 F.3d at 771.
84 Estate of Murphy, 2009 WL 3366099, at *9; Estate of Black, 133 T.C. at 363.
85 Estate of Schutt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-126, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353 (2005).
86 Id at 1361.
87 Id.
88 Holman, 601 F.3d at 771.
89 Id.
90 Estate of Schutt, 89 T.C.M. at 1354.
91 Holman, 601 F.3d at 771.
92 Mezzullo, supra note 80, at 252.
82
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under § 2703(b)(1) for an investment entity (as opposed to an operating
business), the court was really looking for a fact pattern more like those
in Black and Murphy, where the investment entities facilitated real operational involvement with (and influence on) the underlying assets.
This read of Holman rightly limits the family control rationale for a business arrangement to where it can make long-term economic sense.93
This interpretation was borne out in the subsequent Fisher case,
where the taxpayers presented the type of nominal investment strategy
that would have aligned the Holman fact pattern with Schutt.94 In substance, the restricted LLC in Fisher was “a mere asset container” for
personal-use lakefront property.95 Instead of accepting the Schutt-style
buy-and-hold strategy on its face, the Fisher court looked for substantive
evidence of active commercial management. It found none and declared
§ 2703(b)(1) inapplicable on summary judgment.96
As the other leading § 2703(b)(1) case—Estate of Amlie97—illustrates, however, family control is not the only possible rationale to support a “bona fide business arrangement.”98 Certain passive interests can
qualify as well. In Amlie, the taxpayer held a substantial minority interest in a privately-held bank.99 The stake was entirely passive.100 That
bank merged into FABG, another bank.101 At this point, the taxpayer’s
conservator deemed it prudent—and perhaps even required as a fiduciary matter—to secure a fixed-price stock repurchase guarantee from
FABG.102 This at-death reciprocal put/call option (with related transfer
restrictions) between the taxpayer and FABG provided “a hedge against
the risk. . .in holding a minority interest in a closely held bank.”103 Due
to bitter litigation among prospective beneficiaries, the put/call option
93 Brent B. Nicholson, Holman v. Commissioner: A Death Knell for the Tax Value
of Transfer Restrictions in Family Limited Partnerships?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
291, 319-20 (2011) (“The majority in Holman got it right . . . . The arrangement was
certainly not designed for a business purpose.”).
94 Fisher v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-0908-LJM-TAB, 2010 WL 3522952, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2010) (The LLC operating agreement “provides that the Fishers
formed . . . [the LLC] . . .to engage in the business of investing in and holding for investment real property.”).
95 Holman, 601 F.3d at 772 (quoting Estate of Erickson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2007-107, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1181 (2007)).
96 Fisher, 2010 WL 3522952, at *4-5.
97 Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017 (2006).
98 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(1).
99 Estate of Amlie, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1019. Since the underlying business was not
family-controlled, it may seem like Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3) should handle this case.
It does not because the buy-sell agreement did not apply to other shareholders. Id.
100 Id. at 1026.
101 Id. at 1020.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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was instituted between the taxpayer and one of the beneficiaries, her
son Rod Amlie, rather than the taxpayer and the bank.104 However, the
hedging function remained the same. A couple of years later, Rod Amlie negotiated a substantially higher price with FABG for the repurchase
of its shares from him once they passed to him through his mother’s
estate.105
Amlie presents the wrinkle of the second agreement with the beneficiary Rod Amlie, but for purposes of § 2703(b)(1), the important fact
is that a passive minority shareholder in a closely-held business entered
into a buy-sell agreement to hedge her minority-status risk. The Amlie
court found that to be a legitimate rationale for a business arrangement
to qualify under § 2703(b)(1).106 That determination was the right one.
Minority ownership in a closely-held business is particularly risky,107
and absent tax considerations, arm’s-length parties will negotiate to
hedge or otherwise mitigate that risk. As such, even when a transferor
owns a purely passive interest, restrictions and options can still qualify
for § 2703(b)(1). The key is that the underlying business must be
closely-held, such that minority ownership presents real risks beyond
the typical vicissitudes of the market, and the option (along with any
related restrictions) must mitigate that heightened risk.
While nuanced, a § 2703(b)(1) analysis can at least be decided on
the presence (or absence) of specific business contexts.108 It is an objective question whether those circumstances exist. Section 2703(b)(2) asks
whether the option or restriction at issue is “a device to transfer such
property” for below-market value.109 This prong threatens to turn into a
messy, subjective question of testamentary intent. Mercifully, “[C]ourts
applying the device test often look to objective evidence in determining
the parties’ ‘intent’ or ‘purpose.’”110 This approach assures objective,
systematized analysis. Precedential continuity is vitally important here,
providing the specific types of “objective evidence” that are commonly
104

Id. at 1021-22.
Id. at 1022
106 Id. at 1026-27.
107 Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS.
LAW. 699, 699 (1993) (“[C]entralized control and majority rule, when combined with the
lack of a public market for shares in a close corporation, leave a minority shareholder
vulnerable in a way. . .distinct from the risk faced by investors in public corporations.”).
108 Family control and minority risk are not the only justifications for a business arrangement. They are just the most relevant here. Business arrangements can also be bona
fide when used “to retain key employees, to provide management incentives, or to provide shareholder/key-employees with continued employment.” Anthony J. Testa Jr., BuySell Agreements and the Web of Federal Estate and Gift Tax Exposure, 27 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 181, 198 (2002).
109 I.R.C. §2703(b)(2).
110 BOGDANSKI, supra note 39, § 6.04(2)(c)(ii).
105
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considered.111 In Estate of True, the court summed up the list of factors,
as forged in pre-section 2703 precedent:
(1) the decedent’s ill health when entering into the agreement,
(2) lack of negotiations between the parties before executing
the agreement, (3) lack of (or inconsistent) enforcement of
buy-sell agreements, (4) failure to obtain comparables or appraisals to determine the buy-sell agreement’s formula price,
(5) failure to seek professional advice in selecting the formula
price, (6) lack of provision in buy-sell requiring periodic review
of a stated fixed price, (7) exclusion of significant assets from
the formula price, and (8) acceptance of below-market payment terms for purchase of decedent’s interest.112
The True court was discussing these factors in the context of an atdeath buy-sell agreement, but most apply to any other § 2703 restrictions or options.113 These factors are “judged at the time the agreement
is entered” rather than with adjudicatory hindsight,114 which is especially important for the eighth factor. As illustrated in Holman and Amlie, these factors can be weighed and considered based on the particulars
of the situation. In Amlie, factors two through eight weighed in favor of
the taxpayer.115 The buy-sell price was formulated through a professional appraisal based on comparable holdings, and the price adjusted
upward over time.116 Moreover, the price was aggressively negotiated
among adversarial parties.117 The transferor’s health was deteriorating,118 but that meant little in the circumstances, since the conservator
was the self-initiating negotiator. The taxpayer deserved to qualify
under § 2703(b)(2).119
In Holman, ill-health had no relevance to the inter vivos transfer,
but the family members entered the ostensibly value-destroying partnership without negotiation, even though some Dell shares were trans111

Id.
Estate of True v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-167, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 51 (2001),
aff’d, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
113 Id. In terms of application to restrictions or options aside from buy-sell agreements, the treatment should be the same as with the Wilson-Lomb test. See supra text
accompanying note 57.
114 Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017, 1026
(2006).
115 Id. at 1026-27.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1019, 1022.
119 Id. at 1026-27.
112
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ferred into the partnership from the children’s custodial accounts.120
The Holman Tax Court found that the partnership restrictions failed to
qualify for § 2703(b)(2) primarily based on a version of the eighth factor.121 The issue was the partnership’s partner buyout provision for impermissible (i.e., any) transfers. In essence, the parental general partners
could force the purchase of partnership interests from children trying to
sell interests.122 This partnership-interest purchase price would be well
below the value of the underlying Dell equity attributable to that interest.123 The benefit of that value discrepancy would accrue to the other
children in the partnership.124 The court thus found that the partnership
restrictions constituted a vehicle for below-market transfer to the natural objects of the parents’ bounty.125
This approach to the § 2703(b)(2) analysis—weighing all or some of
the True court’s list of objective factors—is the optimal one. A subjective test of intent would more directly address the question that
§2703(b)(2) is meant to answer, but evidentiary issues make a subjective
approach impracticable.126 However, on the opposite end of the spectrum, an inflexible objective test where a taxpayer had to satisfy all the
relevant factors would be inequitable. Consider, for instance, the illhealth criterion. It is often a helpful tool in the testamentary device determination.127 However, were ill-health always required to find against
the taxpayer, it would invert the results in Amlie and Holman, cases that
were both rightly decided. Accordingly, this middle-ground—a menu of
possibly relevant objective factors considered based on which are pertinent to the particular case—is the best approach available. Multi-factor
legal tests can become “redundant, incomplete and unclear,”128 but that
risk is most acute where, unlike here, the test involves imponderable
120 Holman v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 170, 179 (2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010).
One would expect a rational custodian to negotiate some consideration for the exchange
of liquid Dell shares for illiquid, constrictive partnership interests, at least where that
partnership merely holds those same shares.
121 Id. at 195-97. The circuit court declined to review the lower court’s § 2703(b)(2)
analysis. The issue was moot once it affirmed on § 2703(b)(1).
122 Id. at 196.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. The lack of negotiation with respect to the custodial account transfer was perhaps a clearer reason to find § 2703(b)(2) unsatisfied, but the court did not focus on that
aspect of the transaction.
126 Cf. Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980) (choosing an
objective over a subjective test for similar administrability reasons in another tax
context).
127 See, e.g., Estate of Lauder v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-530, 60 T.C.M. (CCH)
977, 978 (1990); Slocum v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 753, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
128 Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986).
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moral (or otherwise incalculable) variables.129 With § 2703(b)(2), these
objective factors are either present or not, and the factors that should be
considered pertinent, as in the ill-health example, are generally self-evident based on the context.
The final prong of the § 2703(b) safe harbor is the requirement that
the terms of the option or restriction “are comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms’ [sic] length transaction.”130 This comparability requirement is final in the sense that it
comes last sequentially in the statute, but more than that, this prong
should be the final one considered because it presents the most difficulty. At first blush, § 2703(b)(3) seems to invite a straightforward application: compare the terms of other actual business arrangements in the
same industry. However, “[A]vailable data on arrangements entered
into among private parties can be sparse, if any exist,”131 and moreover,
“[I]n the same line of business, data will be scarcer still; an entity seems
less likely to share financial data with a competitor than with virtually
anyone else.”132 To combat this problem, one group of lawyers made a
valiant attempt to compile publicly-filed partnership agreements to use
for § 2703(b)(3) comparisons.133 However, as they conceded, “[I]t may
be impractical to identify arm’s length partnership agreements that are
in the same or similar business to that of the partnership under examination.”134 Public resources seemingly do not provide the right data.
Given this evidentiary issue, courts have moved, understandably,
toward accepting expert testimony and—specifically for quantitative restrictions like a buy-sell option price—appraisals based on comparable
market sales. In earlier dicta in Estate of Blount, the Tax Court strongly
indicated that it wanted actual evidence of other, real-world business
arrangements.135 However, by the time of Amlie, the Tax Court was
largely satisfied with an appraisal methodologically similar to the one
dismissed as insufficient in Blount.136 In Holman, while neither the Tax
129

E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976).
I.R.C. § 2703(b)(3).
131 BOGDANSKI, supra note 39, § 6.04(2)(c)(iii).
132 Id.
133 Francis X. Burns et al., Valuing Limited Partnership Interests, 149 TR. & EST.,
Oct. 2010, at 33.
134 Id. at 38. The authors go on to argue that certain financial terms should be comparable across entities in entirely different lines of business, so their methodology should
thus still be usable to satisfy § 2703(b)(3). Id. at 38-39. That argument is debatable as a
normative matter, much less as a legal one under the statute. Moreover, their application
of that premise produced taxpayer-unfriendly results. Id. at 40.
135 Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-116, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1315
(2004), aff’d on this issue, 428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005).
136 Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017, 1027
(2006).
130
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Court nor the Eighth Circuit reached the § 2703(b)(3) issue, commentators were heartened by “the willingness of the court to accept testimony
concerning the comparability requirement” as opposed to requiring
other actual agreements.137 Looking to the legislative history of § 2703,
Congress expressed concern that § 2703(b)(3) should not be made too
high a hurdle for taxpayers,138 and acceptance of expert testimony and
appraisals is consonant with that concern. Moreover, as a matter of
precedential continuity, pre-section 2703 arm’s-length analyses did not
require other business agreements be entered into evidence.139
However, it is still advisable, as both Holman courts did, to consider § 2703(b)(3) only if an option or restriction satisfies all the other
safe-harbor requirements (and cannot otherwise be deemed compliant
or noncompliant). Unlike § 2703(b)(2), where the fact and form of professional input and appraisal are important, § 2703(b)(3) is about the
substance of those professional judgments. The judge needs to choose
between each side’s impeccably-credentialed appraisal experts, who will
each give resolute defense to the market validity (or invalidity) of an
appraisal or restriction.140 The judge is unenviably stuck deciding what
qualifies as reasonable market practice. The courtroom is an ill-suited
forum for such business judgments.141 Accordingly, the Amlie court exemplified the best approach to § 2703(b)(3)—a measure of deference
and an aversion to hindsight bias. In that vein, the Amlie court probed
the relevant appraisal, though not too aggressively.142 Although the equity at issue was priced at an over 84% markup to the buy-sell price
within two years, the court noted the ex post factors that may have con137 Mezzullo, supra note 80, at 250. It is still conjectural how either Holman court
would have ruled on this issue.
138 H.R. REP. NO. 101-964, at 1137 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (“The conferees do not intend . . . to disregard such an agreement merely because its terms differ from those used
by another similarly situated company . . . [G]eneral business practice may recognize
more than one valuation methodology . . . [O]ne of several generally accepted methodologies may satisfy the standard.”); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii).
139 E.g., Dorn v. United States, 828 F.2d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1987); Estate of Carpenter
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-653, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1274, 1280 (1992); see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text (explaining precedential origins of arm’s-length test).
140 E.g., Holman v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 170, 198-99 (2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir.
2010). In its opinion, the Holman Tax Court excerpted testimony from such opposed,
adamant experts. Since the court ultimately declined to address the issue, one imagines
that the court included the excerpts to illustrate the difficulty of § 2703(b)(3).
141 Cf. Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing,
analogously, that judges are ill-suited to determine a market-rate salary); Kamin v. Am.
Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (“The directors’ room rather than
the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business questions.”).
142 See Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017,
1027-28 (2006).
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tributed to the higher price.143 Functionally, the Amlie court employed
§ 2703(b)(3) as a sanity check on the buy-sell agreement, rather than an
invasive analysis. This approach is the right one, and not only due to the
limits of judicial business expertise. As noted above,144 it is important to
consider the ways in which § 2703 departed from established law. The
independent § 2703(b)(3) requirement was one such departure.145 As
such, it must add something to the analysis. However, that imperative
must be balanced against congressional concern with applying
§ 2703(b)(3) too aggressively.146 The Amlie court’s sanity check approach, with an allowance for expert testimony, balances these two
countervailing imperatives.
This Part thus concludes that courts and regulations have been balanced in their overall application of § 2703. Regulations and case law
provide a helpful winnowing function to decide cases without resorting
to § 2703(b). Where a real § 2703(b) safe-harbor analysis is necessary,
the first two prongs of the safe harbor are decided based on fair, objective factors, with the final prong as a somewhat deferential sanity check
on the arrangement’s substance. Post-enactment regulations and case
law have thus addressed concerns about “highly subjective” application
of the statute.147 Certain commentators find § 2703, both in theory and
in practice, far too friendly to either the IRS or taxpayers.148 However,
judged against its congressionally-mandated aims, § 2703 has been, as a
general matter, soundly implemented.
II. REMAINING INTERPRETIVE ISSUES
This review of § 2703’s legislative history and post-enactment interpretation does not only serve to evaluate the statute’s implementation.
It also provides the tools and background necessary to resolve outstanding interpretive issues with the statute. Specifically, this Part address two
sets of issues: (a) unanswered questions about the applicability of
§ 2703(b)(2) to certain transactions and (b) problems of valuation that
often occur once a restriction or option is deemed not to qualify for the
§ 2703(b) safe harbor.
143

See Id.
See supra Part I.A.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
146 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
147 Testa, supra note 108, at 205.
148 Calvin H. Johnson & Joseph M. Dodge, Passing Estate Tax Values Through the
Eye of the Needle, 132 TAX NOTES 939, 941-42 (2011) (finding §§ 2703-04 too weak);
Mark R. Siegel, The Internal Revenue Code’s Assault on Buy-Sell Agreements, 54 LA. L.
REV. 149, 168 (1993) (deeming § 2703 an overly-aggressive “legislative intrusion”).
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A. Section 2703(b)(2) and Inter Vivos Transfers: A Response to
Judge Beam
In his dissent to the majority opinion in Holman, Judge C. Arlen
Beam makes a compelling argument that § 2703(b)(2)—the second
prong of the safe harbor—is only applicable for estate-related (and not
gift or, presumably, inter vivos Generation Skipping Transfer (“GST”))
tax purposes.149 In other words, for purposes of inter vivos transfers,
restrictions or options are only required to satisfy the first and third
prongs of the safe harbor to avoid application of § 2703(a). Judge Beam
reaches this conclusion because § 2703(b)(2) asks whether the option or
restriction at issue is “a device to transfer . . . to members of the decedent’s family.”150 Judge Beam notes—and it is, of course, hard to argue
with him—that the term decedent unambiguously refers to a “dead person.”151 As such, by virtue of its plain language, § 2703(b)(2) only operates when there is a “dead person” at issue,152 i.e. in the estate tax or
postmortem GST context. In Judge Beam’s view, the companion regulation impermissibly expands the reach of § 2703(b)(2) by referencing
“the transferor[ ]”153 where the statute is perfectly clear in its reference
to a “decedent[ ].”154 Thus, insofar as the regulation is a back-door attempt to cover inter vivos transfers, the regulation is invalid.155 Similarly, § 2703(b)(2) only covers “device[s]” to transfer to the decedent’s
“family.”156 Again, in Judge Beam’s view, the regulation makes an endrun around the statute’s unambiguous language. In its second ultra vires
turn of phrase, the regulation expands § 2703(b)(2) to cover transfers to
the broader “natural objects of. . .bounty.”157
The majority did not find it necessary to address § 2703(b)(2),158 so
Judge Beam’s analysis goes unanswered in the majority opinion. The
IRS, however, argued the issue in its brief. The Service makes a twostep argument. First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the inter
vivos applicability of § 2703(b)(2) is ambiguous. Section 2703 is supposed to apply, by the statute’s own terms, “[f]or purposes of this subtitle.”159 As the IRS notes, “this subtitle” is “Subtitle B of the Code,
149

Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 780-81 (8th Cir. 2010) (Beam, J., dissenting).
I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2) (emphasis added).
151 Holman, 601 F.3d at 781.
152 Id.
153 Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1)(ii).
154 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2).
155 Holman, 601 F.3d at 781.
156 Id.; I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2) (emphasis added).
157 Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1)(ii).
158 Their affirmation on § 2703(b)(1) was enough to find the safe harbor
inapplicable.
159 I.R.C. § 2703(a).
150
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which includes the estate tax (Chapter 11), the gift tax (Chapter 12), and
the tax on generation-skipping transfers (Chapter 13).”160 These conflicting aspects of § 2703—the narrower reference to “decedent[ ]”161and the broader reference to the entire “subtitle”162—
engender ambiguity through their tension. This ambiguity moves the
analysis to the deferential territory of the Chevron doctrine.163 Under
Chevron, if a statute is ambiguous, courts must respect an administrative
agency’s interpretation of that statute if that interpretation is, in a broad
sense, “reasonable.”164 The IRS thus asserted that Chevron required the
court to defer to its interpretation of § 2703(b)(2) as embodied in Treas.
Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1)(ii).165 Moreover, the IRS argued that its interpretation fulfilled another norm of statutory construction: holistic reading. As the Supreme Court has explained, “Statutory construction is a
holistic endeavor, and. . .must account for a statute’s full text, language
as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.”166 In the IRS’s
telling, given these interpretive norms, § 2702(b)(2) must be applied as
the IRS reads it, to cover all transfer tax contexts (and to cover all natural objects of bounty). Some commentators have reiterated strands of
the IRS’s argument.167
160 Brief for Appellee at 38, Holman v, Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010) (No.
08-3774), 2009 WL 789127.
161 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2).
162 Id. § 2703(a).
163 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(explaining that if a statute is ambiguous, administrative regulations on points of ambiguity “are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); Brief for Appellee, supra note 160, at 35-37.
164 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (“Chevron expanded . . . mandatory
deference through one simple shift . . . It posited that courts have a duty to defer to
reasonable agency interpretations not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative authority . . . but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute. . . .”).
165 Brief for Appellee, supra note 160, at 34-39.
166 U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brief
for Appellee, supra note 160, at 37.
167 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE, WENDY C. GERZOG & BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, FEDERAL TAXES ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING 193-94 (2011). Dodge,
Gerzog, and Crawford also put forward the argument that Judge Beam inverts the issue.
They argue that, if Judge Beam is correct, an inter vivos transfer can never qualify for
§ 2703(b)(2) since “it is the exception that cannot (literally) apply” to inter vivos contexts.
Id. at 193. However, that counterargument (rather than Beam’s view) is the inversion.
Section 2703(b)(2) is phrased in the negative—requiring that a restriction or option “is
not a device.” I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2) (emphasis added). As such, assuming the validity of
Judge Beam’s literal read of “decedent,” any inter vivos situation, by definition, “is not” a
decedent’s device. Id.
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While the Service offers a colorable argument, their position feels
inadequate relative to Judge Beam’s plain-language obviousness. After
all, Chevron deference does not apply if the statute is clear,168 and in
Judge Beam’s telling, the statutory language could not be clearer. However, the interpretive lessons from Part I demonstrate that Judge Beam’s
appealing § 2703(b)(2) argument is ultimately incorrect.
On this inter vivos issue, the key is to remember that § 2703 was a
partial (and not a full) codification of existing law in this area.169 Prior
to § 2703, established law and regulation granted the IRS power to disregard buy-sell agreements or other § 2703-applicable restrictions for
certain reasons other than those listed in the § 2703(b) safe harbor.170
As Congress stipulated,171 § 2703 was enacted to “supplement, not replace, prior case law.”172 Accordingly, those pre-existing reasons to disregard applicable restrictions remain valid. Congress provided the
example that § 2703 “leaves intact present law rules requiring that an
agreement have lifetime restrictions in order to be binding on death.”173
Prior to § 2703, it was a well-established principle “that restrictive
agreements, such as the buy-sell agreements. . .generally do not control
value for [f]ederal gift tax purposes.”174 In the gift context, the IRS has
long had tremendous leeway to disregard § 2703-type restrictions on
gifts, much more so than in the estate tax context.175 Several considera168 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear . . . the
court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
169 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
170 E.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (as amended 2006); see also Jerold I. Horn, BuySell Agreements Under Chapter 14, Including Amendment/Modification of Grandfathered
Agreements, and Drafting New Agreements, 21 ACTEC NOTES 37-38 (1995) (remarking
on these pre-existing standards still in effect).
171 136 CONG. REC. 30,541 (1990) (“The bill does not otherwise alter the requirements for giving weight to a buy-sell agreement.”). This avowal would be meaningless if
the text of the statute contradicted it. However, the text does not do so. If § 2703(b) is
applicable, it simply means that § 2703(a) “shall not apply.” I.R.C. § 2703(b). Section
2703(b) does not state that, in addition to avoiding § 2703(a), compliance with § 2703(b)
guarantees that no other restriction-disregarding facet of the Code—as expounded
through regulations or case law—will apply, either. To contend otherwise leads to absurd
results. The congressional example given in this portion of the record illustrates this
point, for it cannot be seriously contended that a buy-sell option only binding at death
should control for valuation purposes.
172 Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017, 1024
(2006).
173 136 CONG. REC. 30,541.
174 Estate of True v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-167, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 71 (2001)
(emphasis added) (citing copious pre-section 2703 cases holding that such restrictions do
not control for gift tax purposes), aff’d, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004).
175 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (“[T]he option price is not determinative of fair
market value for gift tax purposes . . . such agreement may or may not, depending upon
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tions motivate this more aggressive gift treatment. The most salient for
buy-sell options specifically is that, in the estate context, “the critical
event (death) that subjects the stock to the purchase right has occurred,
and. . .the seller-estate can receive no more than the formula price.”176
In contrast, gifts are voluntary. If a gift triggers an unwanted buy-sell
obligation, the donor can choose not to give the gift. Where the donor
can make the gift without tripping the buy-sell obligation (but where the
transferred property remains subject to such obligation, which remains
contingent on future events like the donor’s death), the obligation is at
most a potential “factor to be considered” in appraisal.177 The present
value of the interest may be affected, but not controlled, by the formula
price at which it may eventually need to be sold.178
As such, it is irrelevant that the plain language of § 2703(b)(2) only
refers to a “decedent[ ].”179 If anything, given that regulatory background, § 2703(b) serves as a floor (and not a ceiling) for what the IRS
can require to honor restrictions in the gift context. Insofar as the IRS
has, for gifts, required no more than the satisfaction of § 2703(b)’s criteria, then that is the gift standard for taxpayers. Alternatively, at the
least, this background law on gift treatment—when considered as part
of interpreting § 2703(b)(2)—engenders the ambiguity necessary to trigger Chevron deference to the regulation.180 And in either case, this gift
background must be considered through the lens of another interpretive
norm. As the Supreme Court has determined, “The federal estate tax
and the federal gift tax. . .are construed in pari materia, since the purpose of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax by preventing taxfree depletion of the transferor’s estate during his lifetime.”181 The
IRS’s interpretation best actualizes that imperative. Accordingly,
§ 2703(b)(2) can apply equally in both the estate and gift contexts. For
what it is worth, after the enactment of Chapter 14, many practitioners
seemed to assume that § 2703 (including the second safe-harbor prong)
would be so read.182
With that established, it is possible to resolve a few final considerations on this issue. First, on the issue of natural bounty as opposed to
the circumstances of each case, fix the value for estate tax purposes.” (emphasis added));
Rev. Rul. 189, 1953-2 C.B. 294.
176 Estate of True, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 72.
177 Spitzer v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1946).
178 See id.
179 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2).
180 Treas. Reg. §25.2703-1(b)(1)(ii).
181 Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950) (citations omitted).
182 E. James Gamble, Buy-Sell Agreements, Section 2703, and the Final Regulations,
18 ACTEC NOTES 16, 17 (1992) (“Section 2703 also applies for gift tax valuation
purposes.”).

Spring 2015]

I.R.C. SECTIONS 2703 AND 2704(B)

221

family, the argument is much the same. Pre-section 2703 standards like
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) used the “natural bounty” standard for the
test that would become § 2703(b)(2). Moreover, the term “family” is not
defined in § 2703, as in other Chapter 14 sections,183 so that statutory
silence grants the IRS leeway in its gloss of the term. In this vein, the
other regulations blur the distinction between family and natural objects
of bounty,184 so this slippage between the concepts is not novel to
§ 2703(b)(2).
Second, one could argue that that this discussion only settles the
§ 2703(b)(2) issue for estate and gift taxes, but not the GST tax. The
argument is that the above-cited pre-existing law related specifically to
gift (and not GST) tax. That position is unsustainable. Even under Judge
Beam’s interpretation, § 2703(b)(2) covers GST transactions that occur
at or after a transferor’s death since a “decedent[ ]” is present.185 That
leaves inter vivos GST transactions. As a statutory matter, when GST
exemption is allocated on a timely-filed gift tax return, the valuation for
GST purposes statutorily must match the gift valuation.186 Thus, for
someone trying to argue this GST point, they are left asserting that
§ 2703(b)(2) should not apply only to inter vivos GST transfers where
no GST exemption is allocated on a gift tax return. At this point, the
imperative to construe transfer taxes “in pari materia” washes away
what little is left of this GST argument.187
Lastly, to support his argument, Judge Beam notes that Congress
failed in attempts to pass a technical correction to “substitut[e] the legislative phrase ‘members of the decedent’s family’ with the Commissioner’s phrase ‘natural objects of the transferor’s bounty.’”188
According to Judge Beam, the fact that those subsequent bills failed
supports his reading of the statute.189 Insofar as, per the above, the IRS
at least deserves Chevron deference for its interpretation, this issue is
moot. Subsequent unpassed laws do not alter existing laws by negative
implication. To contend otherwise undermines the democratic process,
since it gives weight to legislation that did not have majority support.
Moreover, Congress could have just as plausibly dropped the technical
correction because it decided the issue was already settled.
183

I.R.C. §§ 2701(e), 2702(e), 2704(c)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3).
185 I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2)
186 Id. § 2642(b)(1).
187 Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950) (citations omitted). While Harris was
decided long before the advent of the GST tax, Harris’s rule of construction undoubtedly
applies to GST, since GST polices the borders of the estate tax just as the gift tax does.
188 Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 781 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Horn, supra note
170, at 40.
189 Holman, 601 F.3d at 781.
184
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The analysis required to respond to Judge Beam is far from simple,
and so this Part II.A illustrates the hazards in partial codification of an
already rich area of law. A comprehensive version of § 2703 that fully
codified all existing law would perhaps be clearer. Regardless, the general applicability of § 2703(b)(2) retains a solid interpretive foundation.
B. Valuation When § 2703(a) Applies
1. Post-Holman Confusion about Valuation under § 2703(a)
When the IRS and a taxpayer wrestle over § 2703, the safe-harbor
determination is only half the battle. If the taxpayer loses that question
of law, the fight moves to the particulars of the resulting valuation. It is
unclear from case law what, if any, weight should be given to § 2703applicable restrictions that fail to meet the § 2703(b) safe harbor. The
answer may seem self-evident. Section 2703(a) stipulates that value
must be determined “without regard to” such restrictions,190 and so such
restrictions should be given no weight whatsoever. That answer is
mostly right (with one caveat to be discussed later191), but the result in
Holman has confused that plain meaning.
As has been discussed at length, the Holman court adjudged the
examined partnership restrictions to be outside the § 2703(b) safe harbor.192 After affirming the Tax Court on this point, the majority opinion
moved on to valuation, and it is here that the IRS’s victory became
somewhat pyrrhic.193 Even though the taxpayers lost on the law, they
ultimately received discounts of 22.4%, 25% and 16.5% on their three
respective gifts.194 A portion of those discounts was due to the unregistered nature of the underlying Dell shares,195 but that only generated
part of the discounts.
The court found that no examined restriction in the partnership
agreement qualified under § 2703(b); specifically, sections 9.1 through
9.3 of the partnership agreement—restrictions on the sale or assignment
LP units—were deemed subject to § 2703(a).196 So how did taxpayers
still manage such steep discounts? They succeeded because the IRS did
190

I.R.C. § 2703(a).
See infra Part IV.
192 See Holman, 601 F.3d at 765.
193 As one commentator noted, “The case overall is still a taxpayer victory.” Steve R.
Akers, Commentary, Musings on Current Events: Holman v. Commissioner, ACTEC
.ORG (Mar. 11, 2015, 9:37pm), http://www.actec.org/public/AkersHolman8thCircuit.asp.
194 See Holman v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 170, 216 (2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir.
2010).
195 Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 773-75. A discount for the unregistered nature
of the Dell shares was unquestionably warranted. The IRS only contested the magnitude
of that discount.
196 Holman, 601 F.3d at 767-68.
191
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not challenge all the entity-level restrictions that it could have.197 In particular, the partnership also had limits on partner withdrawal in section
8.4.198 There is no reason to think that section 8.4 would have survived
the § 2703(b) analysis that the other partnership sections failed. If the
IRS had also won on section 8.4, the willing buyer/willing seller test
would produce no (or only a nominal) discount, aside from the discount
for the unregistered nature of the underlying shares. Where withdrawal
rights are unfettered, a rational willing buyer would buy the partnership
interest for a price at (or close) to the market value of the proportional
underlying Dell shares. Subsequent to purchase, the buyer would be
able to redeem its interest for that underlying value199—thereby justifying that price for the partnership interest. Note that in this § 2703(a)
hypothetical where section 8.4 is excised from the agreement, more restrictive default state law restrictions that apply when partnership agreements are silent on withdrawal would also be disregarded.200 Unlike
other simultaneously-enacted provisions,201 § 2703 makes no distinction
between restrictions that are contracted or that apply as a matter of law.
Perhaps because the IRS was not as aggressive as it could have
been in Holman, § 2703(a)’s ultimate valuation effects have been questioned.202 In light of this uncertainty, it is important to recognize that,
for § 2703(a) valuation purposes, entities must treated as if § 2703(a)subject restrictions do not exist. That is the imperative inherent in
§ 2703’s “without regard to” language.203 That complete disregard is an
important law change enacted through the statute. As noted above,
§ 2703 largely codified existing precedent and regulation, but the statute
was not a mere restatement. It also “supplement[ed]” the regulatory
framework.204 Prior regulation contemplated the relative weight to give
197 Assuming its strategic goal in Holman was to establish friendly § 2703 case law,
the IRS may have solely targeted sections 9.1 through 9.3 to keep the litigation focused.
However, this motivation is pure conjecture.
198 See Holman, 130 T.C. at 176.
199 See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW &
PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 21:6 (2014).
200 Holman, 130 T.C. at 175 (stating that Minnesota law governed the Holman partnership); see also MINN. STAT. § 322.16 (2014) (illustrating that in Holman, Minnesota
default law on limited partner withdrawal would apply).
201 I.R.C. § 2704(b).
202 E.g., Deborah M. Beers, Commentary, Fisher v. U.S.: District Court Ignores
Transfer Restrictions in LLC Operating Agreement for Valuation Under § 2703, 35 EST.,
GIFTS & TR. J. 288, 288-90 (2010) (noting uncertainly on Fisher valuation given Holman
result); see also Alden Koste, Note, The IRS Fished Its Wish: The Ability of Section 2703
to Minimize Valuation Discounts Afforded to Family Limited Partnership Interests in
Holman v. Commissioner, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 289, 311-14 (2009).
203 I.R.C. § 2703(a).
204 Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017, 1024
(2006).
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buy-sell agreements and other restrictions.205 By its own terms,
§ 2703(a) is not concerned with relative weight—it is an absolute directive to ignore covered restrictions unless § 2703(b) is applicable. To employ a relative weight analysis is to ignore a core innovation of the
statute.
It is important to note a settled point of law that may seem in tension with this argument. Section 2703 is not a look-through provision.
Whether or not entity-level restrictions are subject to § 2703(a), the
“property” at issue is interests in that entity, not that entity’s underlying
assets. The IRS tried to employ § 2703 as a look-through provision.206 It
argued that that an entity itself can constitute a “restriction” that the
statute disregards.207 However, the Tax Court definitively quashed that
argument in Estate of Strangi.208 The Strangi court was right on this issue. Nothing in the statute’s language indicates that § 2703 should operate as a look-through provision, nor does the existing case law or
regulations provide for that view. If anything, § 2703’s companion regulations point to the opposite. As the regulations explain, § 2703 is not an
all-or-nothing question. If property “is subject to more than one right or
restriction. . .the failure of a right or restriction to satisfy [§ 2703(b)]
does not cause any other right or restriction to fail to satisfy those requirements.”209 In light of this independent analysis of each right and
restriction, consider two taxpayers. Taxpayer A owns an interest in Partnership A, which has two restrictions in its partnership agreement, and
only one of those restrictions qualifies for the § 2703(b) safe harbor.
Partnership A only owns Asset A. Taxpayer B owns an interest in Partnership B, which has only one restriction in its partnership agreement,
and that sole restriction does not meet the safe harbor. Partnership B
only owns Asset B. It would be incongruous as a matter of legal form if
205 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (as amended 1992); see also Estate of True v. Comm’r,
390 F.3d 1210, 1241 (10th Cir. 2004).
206 See S. Stacy Eastland & John W. Porter, Defending the Family Limited Partnership—Estate of White v. Commissioner in the United States Tax Court Docket No. 1441297, 23 ACTEC NOTES 278, 278 (1997) (The IRS “took the position that IRC § 2703 allowed it to disregard completely the existence of the applicable entity, whether or not
that entity was validly created and existing.”).
207 Eastland & Porter, supra note 206, at 304-05, Ex. 4.
208 Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 478, 488-89 (2000) (“Treating the partnership assets, rather than decedent’s interest in the partnership, as the ‘property’ to which
section 2703(a) applies in this case would raise anew the difficulties that Congress sought
to avoid by repealing section 2036(c) and replacing it with chapter 14. . . . Congress did
not intend . . . to treat partnership assets as if they were assets of the estate where the
legal interest owned by the decedent at the time of death was a limited partnership or
corporate interest.”), aff’d on this issue and rev’d in part on other grounds, 293 F.3d 279
(5th Cir. 2002).
209 Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(5).
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the § 2703 property for Taxpayer A were its interest in Partnership A,
while the property for Taxpayer B were Asset B.
The tension arises, as in the above Holman hypothetical with section 8.4, where the valuation of the entity interest equals the value of the
underlying assets. While, in form, that hypothetical differed from a lookthrough analysis, both approaches produced, in substance, equivalent
valuations.210 However, this equivalency only arises when the entity has
no restrictions that qualify under § 2703(b). In such situations, this
equivalency is proper. Such an entity is restriction-free for § 2703 valuation purposes, so it should be frictionless in relation to the underlying
assets. Where any restrictive aspect of an entity or entity-related agreement is respected under § 2703(b), the entity-level and look-through
valuations will diverge.
2. Entity-Owned Insurance to Fund a Disregarded Buy-Sell
Agreement
An interesting challenge to the valuation scheme of § 2703 arose in
Estate of Blount.211 However, the ultimate valuation in Blount runs
counter to the proper valuation method under § 2703. This aspect of
Blount represents a rare recent case where a court has misapplied
§ 2703.
In Blount, the decedent passed away with a controlling-ownership
stake in BCC, an active construction company.212 The deceased owner
had a buy-sell agreement between himself and the corporation.213 A
buy-sell agreement is also known as a “redemption agreement” when it
is implemented, as here, between a shareholder and the company.214
The redemption agreement failed to qualify for the § 2703(b) safe harbor (and was therefore entirely irrelevant for valuation purposes).215
However, the company-counterparty to the buy-sell agreement had
taken out a roughly three-million dollar insurance policy—payable upon
the taxpayer’s death—to finance its contractually-mandated share re210 See Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 775 (8th Cir. 2010). In a look-through analysis, the value would be the value of the underlying assets.
211 Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-116, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303 (2004),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005).
212 Id. at 1305.
213 Id. at 1305-07.
214 Siegel, supra note 148, at 149.
215 See Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, 428 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2005). The
agreement was invalid because the transferor could unilaterally revoke it during life.
Reasoning in the alternative, even if the agreement fulfilled that requirement, it was still
judged to fail the § 2703(b)(3) comparability requirement. The taxpayer’s appraisal essentially ignored nearly two million dollars in liquid assets, so even a sanity check application of § 2703(b)(3) would lead to that finding.
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purchase.216 The Tax Court included those insurance proceeds in the
value of the company without an offset for the buy-sell repurchase obligation.217 The Tax Court did so for two reasons. First, they read the
“without regard to” language of § 2703(a) to require complete disregard
of the buy-sell obligation in the valuation.218 Second, even if the buy-sell
obligation were valid, the Tax Court argued that “the redemption obligation should not be treated as a value-depressing corporate liability
when the very shares that are the subject of the redemption obligation
are being valued.”219 While affirming on the disregard for the buy-sell
agreement, the 11th Circuit reversed on this insurance issue and excluded the insurance proceeds from the valuation.220
The 11th Circuit elaborated minimally in its reversal.221 It cited a
prior case where, for corporate valuation purposes, insurance proceeds
to a corporation used for shareholder redemption were offset against
that redemption requirement.222 However, aside from offering bare precedent for the offset, the case was not examined so as to demonstrate
why the offset was proper. The 11th Circuit also cited Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-2(f)(2), which states in the relevant part that, for business
entity valuation, “consideration shall also be given to nonoperating assets, including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the
benefit of the company, to the extent that such nonoperating assets have
not been taken into account in the determination of net worth.”223 The
appellate panel viewed the use of the proceeds to pay off the redemption obligation as “tak[ing] into account” the life insurance policies
(thereby excluding it from the regulatory imperative to “consider[ ]” the
insurance proceeds in valuation).224
In essence, the court claimed that it saw no reason to treat the
shareholder redemption obligation any differently than a liability to a
third party.225 However, that cannot fully explain its insurance exclusion. The insurance paid most, but not all, of the buy-sell obligation.226
The 11th Circuit allowed the estate, in its valuation, to offset the buy-sell
redemption requirement against the insurance proceeds, but it did not
216

Estate of Blount, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1306.
Id. at 1319.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, 428 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005).
221 Id. at 1345-46.
222 Estate of Cartwright v. Comm’r, 183 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999).
223 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f)(2) (as amended 2006) (emphasis added).
224 Id.; Estate of Blount, 428 F.3d at 1345.
225 See Estate of Blount, 428 F.3d at 1346.
226 Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-116, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1319
(2004), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005).
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allow the estate to offset the remainder of the redemption obligation
against other company assets.227 If the redemption obligation were truly
the same as a third-party liability—like four million dollars in accounts
payable, for instance—the estate would receive a full offset in its valuation. With those hypothetical accounts payable, if the insurance went
toward paying them, the accounts payable would offset the insurance
payment. The excess accounts payable would then net out against other
assets.
Beyond this discrepancy, the 11th Circuit’s reasoning falls apart in
simple application. To see how, one needs to consider the transfer tax
valuation contexts in which this issue is relevant. This insurance issue is
irrelevant where the redemption is subject to a valid buy-sell agreement
that is respected for purposes of § 2703. In that context, the valuation is
already set. As such, the insurance issue only matters where no valid
agreement exists to set the entity interest value for transfer tax purposes—either because the buy-sell agreement is disregarded under
§ 2703 or no agreement exists. In this context, imagine Corporation A
with two shareholders, Owner 1 and Owner 2.228 Each owner has a 50%
interest in Corporation A. The owners have a redemption agreement
with Corporation A that states, for whichever owner dies first, Corporation A will redeem that owner’s interest at fair market value. Corporation A has no liabilities or obligations other than that redemption
agreement. Owner 1 dies first, and at his death, the sole asset of Corporation A is eight million dollars in cash. Of course, Corporation A would
fulfill the redemption obligation by paying Owner 1’s estate four million
dollars. There is no reason to believe that the 11th Circuit would disagree with that common-sense result. Now imagine the same set of facts
with one change—Corporation A also owns an insurance policy that
pays four million dollars upon the death of the first owner to die. The
insurance policy is specifically for funding this redemption obligation. In
this second scenario, how much would Corporation A pay Owner 1’s
estate? Under the 11th Circuit’s reasoning, Corporation A would still
only pay four million dollars, since the at-death insurance proceeds
would be offset against the redemption obligation. In other words, Corporation A in the second scenario, which has twelve million dollars, is
given the same valuation as Corporation A in the first scenario, which
has eight million. The Corporation with four million more dollars and
no additional obligations is given the same fair market value. It is untenable that Corporation A would pay the same amount in both situations,
227

Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, 428 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2005).
For an additional array of hypotheticals demonstrating problems with the 11th
Circuit’s approach, see Adam S. Chodorow, Valuing Corporations for Estate Tax Purposes: A Blount Reappraisal, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 20-29 (2006).
228

228

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:197

since “[c]learly, the company with the insurance is in much better shape
than the company that had none.”229 However, that is what the 11th
Circuit’s reasoning requires.
There are two potential cures to this problem. To be consistent, the
redemption obligation must be either treated as an offsetting liability
against all assets (and not just insurance) or never treated as an offsetting liability. That first cure, however, is impossible in its circularity. In
the first scenario, if the redemption obligation of four million is a liability, it reduces the overall FMV of Corporation A to four million. But
then, based on that lower valuation, the redemption obligation falls to
two million dollars, thereby again changing Corporation A’s overall
FMV to six million. And so on. Thus, the only real solution is to not
treat the redemption obligation as an offsetting liability in either scenario. That is the logic that the reversed Tax Court applied to Blount.
Under this regime, Corporation A pays four million in the first scenario
and six million in the second.230 This logic should hold in any situation
without a buy-sell agreement respected under § 2703. If, as in Blount,
there is a redemption agreement (but it fails to qualify under § 2703(b)),
the analysis is the same. Per Part II.B.1, once the restriction or agreement is deemed subject to § 2703(a), the valuation proceeds as if that
restriction or agreement did not exist.231
The 11th Circuit’s appeal to Treasury Regulations does nothing to
salvage its position. As has been noted, “The legislative history of Treasury Regulations §§ 20.2042-1 and 20.2031-2(f) makes clear that insurance proceeds are to be treated no differently from other types of nonoperating assets when valuing a corporation.”232 In other words, this
special offset of redemption obligations only against insurance (and not
other assets) finds no warrant in the Code. While creating this special
preference for insurance proceeds used to fulfill redemption obligations—a preference that finds no statutory support—judges also fail to
provide “any justification for creating a preference for life insurancefunded redemptions.”233 A Blount proponent could argue that the preference is justified because it will otherwise be too tax-adverse for shareholders to fund buy-sell agreements through insurance. As a preliminary
matter, that argument is insufficient since the Code requires the oppo229 John A. Bogdanski, Stock Buyouts Funded by Life Insurance: The Blount Conundrum, EST. PLAN., June 2006, at 40, 42.
230 However, this does not mean insurance proceeds will increase every valuation
dollar-for-dollar. As with the proper valuation method for any complicated business, it
depends on the particulars of the valuation. See Estate of Huntsman v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.
861, 874 (1976); see also Chodorow, supra note 228, at 17.
231 See Bogdanski, supra note 229, at 41.
232 Chodorow, supra note 228, at 12.
233 Id. at 32.
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site. However, that aside, shareholders can also avoid this valuation issue through cross-purchase agreements, where each shareholder
individually purchases an insurance policy on all the other shareholders.234 Under a cross-purchase agreement, the insurance proceeds accrue to surviving shareholders rather than the corporation, so no
valuation issue arises at the corporate level. While redemption and
cross-purchase agreements can have other distinct tax and business considerations,235 cross-purchase agreements have the added benefits of
avoiding potential AMT implications for insurance payments to C Corporations and increasing basis (relative to redemption agreements) for
purchasing shareholders.236 As such, insurance-funded buy-sell agreements are far from foreclosed if Blount is reversed, even if shareholders
are subsequently averse to redemption agreements. The “without regard
to” valuation rule of § 2703 should thus be applied the same way to
corporate-owned life insurance as anything else.237
III. SECTION 2704(b): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
POST-ENACTMENT INTERPRETATION

AND

There is, however, one material exception to § 2703’s absolute disregard for restrictions that fail to qualify for § 2703(b). This exception is
for certain restrictions on entity liquidation, and it arises because of the
interaction between § 2703 and § 2704(b). To understand the scope of
this exception, it is first necessary to review the history and prevailing
interpretation of § 2704(b). As this review demonstrates, § 2704(b) has
been, in application, an unmitigated failure.
In form, § 2704(b) operates similarly to § 2703. The statute stipulates that whenever (i) someone transfers “an interest in a corporation
or partnership”238 to family and (ii) “the transferor and members of the
transferor’s family hold. . .control of the entity,”239 any “applicable restriction” is “disregarded” in the transfer tax valuation of that interest.240 An applicable restriction is any restriction that “effectively limits
the ability of the corporation or partnership to liquidate,”241 if the restriction either (i) lapses post-transfer or (ii) is removable by the “transferor or any member of the transferor’s family, either alone or
234

See David Joy et al., Structuring Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements, THE CPA JOURJune 2004, at 37.
235 See id. at 37-38; Siegel, supra note 148, at 150-59.
236 David Joy et al., supra note 234, at 37.
237 I.R.C. § 2703(a); see Bogdanski, supra note 229, at 41-42.
238 I.R.C. § 2704(b)(1)(A).
239 Id. § 2704(b)(1)(B).
240 Id. § 2704(b)(1)(A).
241 Id. § 2704(b)(2)(A).
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collectively.”242 In essence, if a family controls a partnership or corporation and self-imposes a liquidation restriction on the entity, that restriction will not be respected for transfer-tax valuation purposes.
However, as with § 2703, the statute has a safe-harbor provision for
certain restrictions. Even if covered under § 2704(b)(1), a liquidation
restriction will be respected if it is either (i) a “commercially reasonable
restriction”243 related to third-party financing arrangements or (ii) “imposed, or required to be imposed, by any Federal or State law.”244 The
first safe-harbor option is analogous in purpose to the § 2703(b) safe
harbor. In essence, as with § 2703(b), this financing safe harbor is attempting to sort out the types of “commercially reasonable” liquidation
restrictions that arm’s-length parties would accept.245 The more relevant
safe harbor—and crux of § 2704(b)’s problems—is the second one. As
interpreted in the regulations, this second safe harbor covers liquidation
restrictions “that would apply under the State law generally applicable
to the entity in the absence of” any contracted liquidation restrictions in
the corporate documents or partnership agreement.246 Put more plainly,
the safe harbor protects any liquidation restrictions that are less restrictive than (or equally restrictive as) state law defaults. The implications
of this approach are best considered through example. Imagine Family
A, members of which wholly-own Partnership A. Partnership A’s partnership agreement requires at least 60% of partners to approve a liquidation. But for the safe harbor, that liquidation restriction would be an
applicable restriction subject to § 2704(b)(1). It would thus be ignored
in transfer-tax valuation of interests in Partnership A. However, Partnership A is subject to the laws of State A. Under State A law, the default is that 75% of partners must assent to liquidation. Since the 60%
requirement is less restrictive than state law, it will qualify for the safe
harbor. To fully flesh out the safe harbor, it is helpful to consider three
additional permutations of this fact pattern. The facts are the same as
above, except: (i) the partnership agreement requires 75% of partners
to vote for liquidation, (ii) the partnership agreement requires 90% of
partners to vote for liquidation or (iii) the partnership agreement is silent on liquidation. All three scenarios result in the same treatment
under § 2704(b). In scenario (i), the partnership agreement still qualifies
for the safe harbor, since it is no more restrictive than the state-law default.247 In (ii), the liquidation restriction does not qualify since it is
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id. § 2704(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 2704(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 2704(b)(3)(B).
Id. § 2704(b)(3)(A).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b).
Id.
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more restrictive than state law.248 However, the restriction is not disregarded entirely—§ 2704(b) would instead value Partnership A as if it
had a restriction no more restrictive than the state law default.249 Partnership A would thus receive the same valuation treatment under (ii) as
under (i). Lastly, in (iii), state law defaults that actually apply to an entity are respected just as if, per (i), a partnership agreement expressly
incorporated the default standard.250
Put bluntly, this interaction with state law defaults is a mess. Even
absent tax planning, the reference to the default workings of state entity
law renders the statute confusing. It is not simple to determine what
qualifies as the default. If a fixed-term partnership is established in a
state that follows the original or revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, then the state law default will generally be that no partner has a
liquidation right.251 Is that the default, or should the statute involve a
“blank page” approach, which considers what the default would be without any other partnership terms in the agreement? One practitioner articulated the answer while explaining the fundamental problem with the
§ 2704 safe harbor:
The confusion. . .stems directly from the confusion inherent in
the statute [§ 2704(b)]. A statute drafted. . .with a reference. . .to another body of law generally, is known. . .as a ‘referential statute’. . .few legislative drafting devices are more rife
with ambiguity. . .
....
In truth, there is nothing in I.R.C. § 2704(b) or in the regulations thereunder which compels either view [on contextual or
“blank page” defaults] . . . . There is no way to determine in a
vacuum what limitations are imposed under state law generally
applicable. Law is a formula, not a result.252
If that “inherent” ambiguity were not enough,253 the default law safe
harbor has come to swallow the whole rule due to subsequent state lawmaking. Numerous states have enacted more restrictive default entity

248

Id.
Id.
250 Id.
251 See Kenneth P. Brier, Family Limited Partnerships and Chapter 14: Some Estate
Planning Perspectives, 21 ACTEC NOTES 297, 300 (1996).
252 Id. (citations omitted).
253 Id.
249
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liquidation rules to qualify under the § 2704(b)(3)(B) state-law safe harbor.254 It is now easy to avoid application of § 2704(b)(1).
Given the statute’s weakness, it is unsurprising that §2704(b) was
“hurriedly drafted.”255 Unlike § 2703, which was refined through numerous bills and expert input,256 § 2704(b) was not added until the Conference Committee’s reconciled bill.257 It is impossible to know exactly
what happened in that Committee, but the best guess is that the Committee considered § 2704 in isolation (and not in relation to other sections of Chapter 14). The motivation for § 2704(b) was this concern that
taxpayers could avoid § 2704(a)—which deals with liquidation rights
that lapse at death—by never granting liquidation rights in the first
place.258 It may be that no one stopped to think that § 2703 could already cover ongoing restrictions. One can perhaps attribute this oversight to the legislative conditions at the time of passage. The broader
budget bill that included Chapter 14 was a hard-fought, politically explosive battle.259 The massive bill’s eventual passage took place under a
compressed timeline.260 It is easy to imagine, during the harried conference, a sleep-deprived congressional staffer pushing § 2704(b) without
fully considering its potential flaws.
Notwithstanding those flaws inherent in the statute, the IRS undertook a sustained effort to employ § 2704(b) aggressively. This effort ended in failure. In late-nineties TAMs, the IRS took the position that it
could look to default state-law provisions for individual partner or
shareholder withdrawal to define the scope of state law default liquidation rights for purposes of § 2704(b)(3)(B).261 This position was a variation on the above-mentioned “blank page” method for determining
254

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRAFISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 79 (Feb. 2012); DODGE, GERZOG &
CRAWFORD, supra note 167, at 509; e.g., S. 350, 75th Sess. § 25-27 (Nev. 2009).
255 Richard L. Dees, The Slaying of Frankenstein’s Monster: The Repeal and Replacement of Section 2036(c), 69 TAXES 151, 166 (1991).
256 Id. at 153.
257 H.R. REP. NO. 101-964, at 1138 (1990) (Conf. Rep.). The prior Senate bill did
have a provision to disregard “any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms
will never lapse.” S. 3209, 101st Cong. § 7210(a) (1990). However, that provision is so
different from the eventual § 2704(b) as to be distinct.
258 Brier, supra note 251, at 300; Dees, supra note 255, at 165.
259 See William Eaton, Congress Passes $490-Billion Cut in Deficit; Bush to Sign Bill,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1990, at A1; see also Countdown to Crisis: Reaching a 1991 Budget
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1990, at A20.
260 136 CONG. REC. 30,730 (1990) (“We’re now trying to do in 3 weeks and just
before an election what we normally do in 9 months,” stated Senator Grassley); Eaton,
supra note 259, at A1.
261 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-30-004 (July 25, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-25002 (June 20, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-23-009 (June 6, 1997).
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state law defaults.262 The IRS claimed support for its reference to default withdrawal rights based on § 2704(b)’s companion regulations. The
regulations refer to an ability to liquidate an entity “in whole or in
part.”263 The IRS viewed withdrawal as a form of partial liquidation.264
Under common state law, each partner in a “blank page” partnership
has a unilateral withdrawal right upon sufficient notice.265 As such, by
conflating withdrawal with partial liquidation, the IRS established a narrow view of most state-law defaults for purposes of the § 2704(b)(3)(B)
safe harbor. Moreover, the IRS also took an aggressive position on the
types of liquidation restrictions that could be subject to § 2704(b) in the
first instance. As noted above, to be an “applicable restriction” under
§ 2704(b), the transferor or his or her family members must have the
ability to (or in fact) remove the liquidation restriction post-transfer.266
One could thus circumvent § 2704(b) by (i) requiring the consent of all
partners or shareholders to liquidate and (ii) giving a portion of equity
to a cooperative third party. In that case, the family would not technically be able to liquidate the partnership on its own. The IRS took the
quite aggressive position that it could disregard such third-party owners
if it deemed them to be straw men.267
In Kerr v. Commissioner,268 the Tax Court rejected the IRS’s
stance. In Kerr, the partnership agreement stipulated that the partnership would liquidate “upon the earlier of December 31, 2043, or by
agreement of all the partners.”269 The entity was Texas law governed,
and the Texas law default for partnership liquidation was equally (or
arguably more) restrictive than the partnership agreement.270 However,
the IRS pointed to Texas’s default partner withdrawal rule, which allowed unilateral withdrawal upon six months’ notice.271 The Tax Court
flatly rejected the Service’s conflation between withdrawal and liquidation, noting the Service’s position was inconsistent with examples provided in the regulations.272 The court found that the liquidation
restriction qualified for the safe harbor.273
262

Brier, supra note 251, at 300.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (emphasis added).
264 See sources cited supra note 261.
265 See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 199, § 21:6.
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post-transfer. See also Id. § 2704(b)(2)(B)(i).
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269 Id. at 471.
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At the appellate level, the 5th Circuit affirmed on other grounds.274
However, the 5th Circuit did not dismiss the lower court’s reasoning.
Instead, the 5th Circuit rejected the IRS’s other main § 2704(b) argument by finding that the liquidation restriction was not even an “applicable restriction” in the first instance.275 The partnership had one nonfamily partner—the University of Texas (UT), which had received interests as a charitable gift.276 In terms of testing the Service’s “straw man”
argument, UT was the ideal candidate. The IRS and the taxpayer both
agreed that “UT would convert its interests into cash as soon as possible,”277 so it could be assumed that UT would always vote for a pro rata
liquidation. However, the IRS still lost. As the 5th Circuit found, “The
Code provides no exception allowing us to disregard nonfamily partners
who have stipulated their probable consent to a removal of the restriction.”278 In other words, the IRS’s “straw man” argument was invalid,
even under the most IRS-friendly circumstances.
Kerr was a staggering loss for the IRS. Like Charlie Brown trying to
kick Lucy’s football, the IRS made several more fruitless attempts to
push the same § 2704(b) arguments in court. It lost each time, with the
Tax Court curtly referring the Service back to Kerr.279 The courts were
right to reject the IRS’s arguments. Nothing in the statute or the regulations indicates that withdrawal should constitute partial liquidation, and
that argument is contrary to common sense. If a large partnership redeems and retires a small partner’s interest in the ordinary course, it
would be improper to describe that partnership as in partial liquidation.
Rather, one would say a partner had withdrawn. The two concepts are
distinct. Similarly, nothing in the statute provides for the “straw man’
rule. From a revenue-raising perspective, it would certainly be helpful if
the statute included that rule, but it would be improper for courts to
legislate that concept into the statute by judicial fiat. The simple fact is
that, given the ease of avoidance, § 2704(b) was dead letter on arrival.
For neither the first nor the last time, Congress wrote a bad law.

274
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278 Id.
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T.C. 506, 520 (2000); Estate of Harper v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-202, 79 T.C.M.
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Section § 2704(b)’s weakness creates interesting problems, from the
interpretive impact on § 2703 to possible policy responses. This Part
considers the ability (or inability) of § 2703 to apply where § 2704(b) is
potentially applicable. It also reviews regulation revisions that the IRS
could implement to strengthen § 2704(b). Lastly, this Part considers proposed legislative changes to § 2704(b) and offers a different approach to
that reparative legislation.
When considered in relation to § 2703, § 2704(b) is effectively a
limit on the IRS’s § 2703 power rather than an additional grant of authority to disregard liquidation restrictions. It is doubtful that is what
Congress intended, but it is hard to read the statutes together any other
way. Absent § 2704(b), § 2703 would cover liquidation restrictions, since
they are certainly, just as Holman-style limits on transfer,280 value-depressing restrictions on sale and use.281 Under § 2703(a), it makes no
difference that a restriction results from inaction—a failure to elect
more liberal liquidation rules than the default—as opposed to action. It
also should not matter if an entity-level restriction is required by law for
that entity.282 The only question is whether the restriction qualifies for
the § 2703(b) safe harbor.
However, proper statutory interpretation precludes reading
§ 2703(a) to cover liquidation restrictions. If § 2703(a) is read that way,
it renders § 2704(b) meaningless.283 That violates the interpretive norm
that statutes “should be read to avoid rendering superfluous any parts
thereof.”284 If § 2703 were enacted after § 2704, one could argue that
§ 2703 implicitly superseded § 2704. However, even that argument
would be difficult since “repeals by implication are not favored. . .and
will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest.”285 In
any case, since these sections were enacted simultaneously in the same
280

See supra Part II.B.1
I.R.C. § 2703(a).
282 See supra Part II.B.1; see also Johnson & Dodge, supra note 148, at 941 n.20 (“[I]f
one knowingly transfers assets to an entity subject to [a restriction] . . . the restriction is
indeed self-imposed.”).
283 One could counter that § 2704(b) is already meaningless since it is so easily avoidable, but that is a different (and here irrelevant) species of meaninglessness. The distinction is between a statute that is ineffective in practice because of taxpayers’ responses
and one that is meaningless from the get-go as a matter of statutory interpretation. See
I.R.C. § 2704(b).
284 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (interpreting so as to avoid “mere
surplusage”).
285 Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (citations omitted).
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legislative package, the heavy presumption is to construe them both to
be meaningful. Since § 2703 can be reasonably read not to encroach on
§ 2704(b)—by excluding liquidation restrictions from § 2703’s reach—it
must be read that way. The companion regulations buttress this view.
They state, “An option, right to use property, or agreement that is subject to section 2703 is not an applicable restriction” under § 2704(b).286
Rephrased in the logical inverse, an applicable restriction under
§ 2704(b) cannot also be subject to § 2703.
A last-gasp interpretive attempt to apply § 2703 would argue that
§ 2703 can apply to liquidation restrictions that are not applicable restrictions under § 2704(b). As the Kerr case demonstrated,287 plenty of
suspect liquidation restrictions can escape § 2704(b) by avoiding the
“applicable restriction” label. If, by its terms, § 2704(b) is unconcerned
with these restrictions, why should § 2703 be precluded from covering
them? The answer is twofold. First, the title of §2704(b)—“Certain Restrictions on Liquidation Disregarded”288—counsels against that interpretation. That only “[c]ertain” restrictions are disregarded implies that
the section is not just meant to define a group of disregarded restrictions, but also a group that is not disregarded.289 If § 2703(a) covers all
liquidation restrictions that are not applicable restrictions, then
§ 2704(b) loses its implied role as the delineator between “[c]ertain” disregarded and regarded liquidation restrictions.290 Second, an interpretation that allows § 2703 to cover liquidation restrictions that are not
applicable restrictions leads to a perverse result. In this construction,
§ 2704(b) essentially becomes a safe harbor against § 2703. Since
§ 2704(b) is so much weaker than § 2703, a tax-conscious taxpayer
would want a liquidation restriction to be an applicable restriction
rather than face § 2703. That interpretation is uncomfortable, to say the
least. The best holistic interpretation remains that § 2704(b) covers all
liquidation restrictions while § 2703 covers everything else.
Moving from statutory interpretation to regulatory authority, another compelling question is whether the IRS has any rulemaking power
to strengthen § 2704(b). There are two paths the IRS could follow. The
first is a dead end. The second, while not a full fix, would stiffen
§ 2704(b) somewhat (and would better harmonize the text of § 2704(b)
with the regulations).
In terms of the dead end, the IRS could argue that it has authority
pursuant to § 2704(b)(4) to issue regulations strengthening § 2704(b) by,
286
287
288
289
290

Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b).
Kerr v. Comm’r, 292 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2002).
I.R.C. § 2704(b) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.

Spring 2015]

I.R.C. SECTIONS 2703 AND 2704(B)

237

for instance, circumscribing the state-law safe harbor under
§ 2704(b)(3)(B). Under § 2704(b)(4), the IRS can issue regulations to
“provide that other restrictions shall be disregarded. . .if such restriction
has the effect of reducing the value of the transferred interest” artificially.291 The Kerr Tax Court noted this provision was a grant of “broad
regulatory authority.”292 Arguably, the IRS could take the position that
it can use this provision to pass regulations allowing it disregard any
restrictions, including liquidation restrictions that are not disregarded
under the rest of §2704(b). However, that position is untenable. The
reference to “other” restrictions most naturally reads to mean restrictions other than liquidation restrictions.293 If that were not the case,
then the marginal regulatory discretion in § 2704(b)(4) would be able to
re-write the other express terms of the statute. If Congress intended
§ 2704(b)(4) to be that broad, it would not have bothered to include the
rest of § 2704(b). Even for restrictions “other” than liquidation restrictions,294 this regulation-writing grant cannot be used especially broadly.
In its context, section § 2704(b)(4) is most naturally read to mean that
the IRS can subject restrictions (other than restrictions on liquidation)
to the terms of § 2704(b).295 To contend otherwise makes § 2704(b)(4)
impossibly powerful. If §2704(b)(4) allows the IRS to disregard restrictions in any manner (rather than just subjecting them to §2704(b)), the
IRS could issue regulations stating, for example, that all restrictions on
transfer are disregarded. It could apply that rule to entities whether or
not family-owned and whether or not safe-harbored under § 2703(b).
That cannot be so, and contextual interpretation counsels against such a
broad reading.296
However, the IRS is not bereft of regulatory tools to strengthen
§ 2704(b). The Kerr court alluded to another regulatory change the IRS
could make. When the Kerr court compared the required-by-law safe
harbor of § 2704(b)(3)(B) with the companion regulations, it noted the
regulations were “an expansion of the [statutory safe harbor] exception.”297 The Tax Court provided no explanation for this comment.
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However, the court had seemingly recognized that the statute itself only
references restrictions “imposed, or required to be imposed” by law.298
The statute does not reference defaults. It is the regulations that introduce the default concept.299 Per the Kerr court’s observation, the statutory safe harbor is most sensibly read to refer, not to default rules, but
required rules that cannot be contracted away. Only the latter are truly
“imposed.”300 The legislative history supports this reading.301 To be true
to the statute, the regulations should be amended so that the
§ 2704(b)(3)(B) safe harbor only covers required (and not default) restrictions.302 This revision has the added benefit of making § 2704(b)
somewhat more effective. It is relatively easy to make classes of entities
that have exceedingly restrictive default liquidation rules, since owners
can contract out of those rules. The default is set at the maximum level
of restriction, and owners modify as needed. That easy contractual control disappears for entities that include required, unalterable restrictive
liquidation provisions. Thus, § 2704(b) will become harder to avoid.
However, this change, while ameliorative, will not fix the statute. In response, states will undoubtedly create menus of entity types with an array of required restrictive liquidation terms. These entities will be
separate from standard partnerships, LLCs, corporations, etc., and only
the transfer-tax conscious will opt to create them.303 Taxpayers will no
longer be able to custom-tailor their own entities, so states will respond
by offering more tailored entity options up front. Even so, maneuvering
required rules is inevitably less user-friendly than default ones, so the
rule change will make § 2704(b) mildly harder to avoid. This strengthening of § 2704(b) is material but still marginal.
After defining the limits of regulatory change, the natural next
question is what could be done through legislation. Notwithstanding the
rule change proposed above, § 2704(b) requires reparative legislation.
Aside from the issues already discussed, the statute remains otherwise
flawed and easily avoidable due to, for instance, its narrow definition of
family and the related straw-man problem.304 As with most any issue in
the current political climate—much less one related to the transfer tax
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system—federal legislative action appears unlikely. However, it is worth
noting that this twin consideration of § 2703 and § 2704(b) shows the
best approach to take if and when reparative legislation becomes viable.
Current reform proposals are quite complicated. The Treasury Department has put forward a plan to, in essence, undo Kerr.305 Under the
Treasury proposal, rather than allude to other state and federal law for
the § 2704(b)(3)(B) safe harbor, liquidation restrictions would be disregarded if they are “more restrictive than a standard to be identified in
regulations.”306 To fix the straw man problem, “certain interests. . .held
by charities or others who are not family members of the transferor
would be deemed to be held by the family.”307 Section 2704(b) would
also be expanded to cover “an additional category of restrictions” including transfer restrictions.308 To help taxpayers cope with this expanded § 2704(b), the IRS would be given the authority to create safe
harbors “so as to avoid the application of section 2704 if certain standards are met.”309
This proposal is too complex. It just drives more cars into the pileup
that is § 2704(b). Specific safe-harbor standards hardwired into the statute will either be too general or so specific as to require volumes of
explanation. What should be the minimum acceptable liquidation restriction for an Oregon partnership that holds a family’s plumbing supply business? How about a single-member Delaware LLC that holds
marketable securities and a fractional interest in actively-cultivated
farmland? The statute could not possibly be long enough to satisfactorily cover every such business context. The same problem arises in delineating who is or is not a straw man for purposes of the deemedcontrol analysis. Moreover, that new safe-harbor power would turn into
a succession of whack-a-mole regulatory revisions as the IRS tries to
curb the avoidance that blossoms with each new safe harbor.
There is an easier way, one that will shorten and streamline the
Code rather than expand it. Section 2704(b) should be repealed, with a
stipulation that § 2703 covers liquidation restrictions. Section 2703 is a
balanced, battled-tested method for evaluating valuation discounts. It
makes sense for that provision to occupy the field. While Treasury’s proposed § 2704(b) revisions would require pages upon pages of complex
new regulations, this § 2703 approach piggybacks on existing law and
standards. Since § 2703 builds on decades of regulations and case law, its
general concepts have been well fleshed out in their application.
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Through that precedent, practitioners have learned what to expect from
§ 2703, so the transition out of § 2704(b) would be a smooth one. The
ABA has already gestured toward this idea, proposing that a § 2703style arm’s-length standard should be imported into § 2704(b).310 It is
just a few steps further from that proposal to entirely replacing
§ 2704(b) with § 2703.
CONCLUSION
This analysis has painted a tale of two statutes—§ 2703, which has
been largely successful in implementation, and § 2704(b), which has
largely failed. These divergent statutory fates demonstrate the importance of thoughtful, iterative drafting with the benefit of expert input.
Indeed, the final form of § 2703 can be traced to practitioner comments.311 While § 2703 also demonstrates the benefits of building on existing standards, it shows the potential for confusion and complexity in
partial codification of a larger body of tax law.
This analysis concluded with legislative and regulatory proposals to
improve the interrelated operation of these statutes, but these object
lessons are generalizable beyond these two Code sections. However difficult transfer tax valuation may be, § 2703 shows the benefit of incorporating prior experience into current rules.

310

AM. B. ASSOC. SECTION OF TAXATION, OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM AND SIMPLIRESPECT TO FEDERAL ESTATE, GIFT AND GST TAXES 3 (Apr. 2012).
Hearing, supra note 13, at 97-98.

FICATION WITH

311

